Climate change, migration and the cosmopolitan dilemma. by Held,  David
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
28 February 2018
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Held, David (2016) 'Climate change, migration and the cosmopolitan dilemma.', Global policy., 7 (2). pp.
237-246.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12309
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article: Held, David (2016). Climate Change, Migration and the
Cosmopolitan Dilemma. Global Policy 7(2): 237-246, which has been published in ﬁnal form at
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12309. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With
Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Climate Change, Migration and the Cosmopolitan Dilemmai 
David Held 
Abstract: At its simplest, migration refers to the movement of people and their 
temporary or permanent geographical relocation. People have always been on 
the move and they have moved over great distances. In this article I set out a brief 
historical understanding of migration, and then focus on Europe and, finally, 
current dilemmas of European migration policy. In an era of climate change, war 
and uneven development, the pressures of migration have grown and could soon 
create an ever greater avalanche of movement. States act in a paradoxical way. 
On the one hand, they recognise the nature of the migration crisis and the 
necessity to broaden the definition of those who need urgent assistance.  On the 
other hand, most host countries act on increasingly narrow definitions of those 
who warrant assistance and perhaps resettlement. This dilemma is examined and 
tentative steps are set down to show how it might be resolved. 
 
In this article I sketch something of the history of people on the move. I set out an historical 
understanding of migration, and then focus on Europe and, finally, current dilemmas of European 
migration policy. These dilemmas are acute: liberal and democratic states entrench the rights and 
duties of their citizens, while policing their borders to ensure these privileges are rarely available to 
others. In this lies their dual role as champions of the universal and the particular, creating a tension, 
if not contradiction, at the heart of their structure and policies – which constantly pushes and pulls 
them in different directions.  
Core Trends 
One form of globalisation is more ubiquitous than any other – human migration (see Held 
and McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999). At its simplest, migration refers to the movement of 
people and their temporary or permanent geographical relocation. People have always been on the 
move and they have moved over great distances. There are many impulses behind these 
movements: victorious armies and empires have swept across and implanted themselves into new 
territories; the defeated and dispossessed have fled to defensible land and safer havens; the 
enslaved have been torn from their homes and relocated in the lands of the enslaver; convicts and 
prisoners have been forcefully relocated; the unemployed and the underemployed have searched 
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for work; the persecuted have sought asylum; and the curious and adventurous have always been 
travelling, drifting and exploring.  
William McNeill argued that two distinctions, one geographical, one social, characterise 
most forms of migration in human history: central and peripheral migration, and elite and mass 
migrations (1976, 1978). Most often, elite migrations have taken the form of military-led conquests 
on the periphery of states and empires, followed by the settlement of border regions and marches 
by an aristocracy and their subalterns. This kind of settlement could be accompanied by elite 
migrations of missionaries, merchants and bureaucrats as well as by the mass migration of settling 
nomads and peasant agrarians moving on to new, less populated lands. Migrations to the periphery 
must be distinguished from flows to the centre: local elites migrate to the centres of political power 
and economic activity in cities and royal courts, while the rural poor and skilled head to the city in 
search of work. McNeill’s model is well suited to the greater part of human history in which centre 
and periphery, urban and rural, provide a more accurate representation of political space than one 
demarcated by fixed political borders. Indeed, it can be argued that it was outward migrations that 
helped define and extend the outer limits of political control of a state or empire rather than the 
crossing of immutable political boundaries.  
The large-scale movement of people and peoples has an enormously long history (Fagan, 
1990; Emmer, 1993; Bacci, 2012). Since the emergence of the first rudimentary states over six 
thousand years ago, human migrations have crossed fragile boundaries as well as extended and 
reshaped them. Mobile nomads have crossed continents and carved out new empires. Some older 
polities have acquired an internal dynamism that allowed them to push outwards from the centre. 
Religion and economics have propelled missionaries and merchants across continents. Here I outline 
some of the main lines of migration history as they have been shaped by Europe and, in turn, shape 
Europe. 
Most migrations were, more accurately, regional rather than global in extent (though Islam’s 
African, European and South East Asian outposts do indicate processes of global migration). From 
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the late sixteenth century, however, a case can be made that levels of migration significantly 
increased as a result of Europe’s changing economic and military dynamics. The early years of 
European expansion were not marked by an easy or effortless dominance but by the precariousness 
of Europe’s technological and military edge and the miniscule level of actual migration that followed 
the conquest of the New World (Fernández-Armesto, 1995). The transoceanic extent of the 
European invasions may have geographically exceeded most earlier processes of conquest and 
migration, but its intensity and durability initially remained low. However, three patterns of global 
migration and movement emanating from, or controlled by, European powers heralded an era of 
migration that came to exceed its historical predecessors both in extent and in intensity (see figure 
1). These migrations were the acceleration and completion of the European conquest and 
population of the Americas and Oceana; the transatlantic slave trade that fuelled the economic 
development of the colonies; and the mass movement of Asian labour that eventually replaced the 
labour flows extinguished by the termination of slaving (Curtin, 1969; Fox-Genovese and Genovese, 
1983). 
For most of the long nineteenth century (1760-1914) economic forces were the primary 
movers of migratory flows (see Held and McGrew et al., 1999, pp.287-297). The early push of 
religious persecution and the pull of distant and exotic wealth in the seventeenth century gave way 
to the blunter realities of differential economic development and opportunities in the Americas for 
many Europeans. Even when the slave trade was halted in the nineteenth century the scope and 
scale of European and Asian migrations continued to escalate into the early twentieth century. 
These great waves of migration were brought to an almost complete halt by the First World War. 
When the smoke cleared in 1918 the situation was transformed: the demand for European, Asian 
and African labour in the colonies was in decline; a nationalist and exclusionary politics was on the 
rise in many states, and the restricted immigration policies which flowed from this slowed further 
the pace of the older global migrations. Economic dislocation in Europe after the First World War, 
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combined with the global economic downturn of the 1930s, ensured that levels of global migration 
remained very low through the interwar period.  
While the relative geographical extensity and intensity of the post-1914 and post-1945 
migrations were closely balanced, there can be no doubt that the post-Second World War era saw a 
steady expansion in migratory flows, albeit marked by phases, relative to the interwar period. There 
is now almost no state or part of the world that is not exporting or importing labour (see figure 2). 
With the collapse of European and Soviet communism a swathe of new areas, previously sealed off, 
became caught up in migratory flows. These flows were not exclusively towards the OECD states, 
though a significant component of them was. There were also major new patterns of migration 
within South-East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, among other areas. All 
these areas became locked into both regional and global patterns of migration.  
The historical pattern of post-War migration for most European countries has been fourfold. 
First, there was an initial low starting point after the Second World War, temporarily raised by the 
shifting movement of the many displaced peoples generated by the war itself. Second, there was 
increasing growth in migration rates in the 1950s, accelerating in the 1960s, and peaking somewhere 
in the early 1970s. The impact of the oil shocks on economic performance, the falling demand for 
labour and the consequently bitter politics of immigration are clearly evident in the statistics of the 
time. Third, after the mid-1970s migration continued, if at slightly lower levels, driven more by 
family reunions than the push and pull of global economic factors. Fourth, in the 1980s, varying 
between countries, the rate of migration began to accelerate again. This intensified in the early 
1990s as the economic booms in Western Europe, the post-1989 turbulence in east and central 
Europe and the former Yugoslavia pushed levels of immigration back up again. While war and 
conflict continued to generate refugee and asylum flows, the overwhelming majority of 
contemporary migrations remained economically driven, leaving political borders untouched. 
Europe: Borders, Surveillance and Conflict 
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The capacity of modern European states to seal their borders has never been perfect 
(Castles and Miller, 1993; Pohlmann et al., 2013). Prior to the last three centuries, states were 
demarcated by the amorphous and permeable grey areas of frontiers and peripheries in which 
sovereignty gradually dissolved rather than being abruptly truncated. States have always tried to 
control the movement of peoples through these regions and have been concerned with patterns of 
peripheral settlement and population movement. In this context, European states have a long and 
often deeply dishonourable record of forced expulsions, of the Jews and Huguenots, for example.  
Contemporary forms of border control were pioneered by the USA in the late nineteenth 
century. The concentration of immigrants in oceangoing ships in a few key harbours, on the east and 
west coasts of the USA, meant that a greater concentration of state resources could be brought to 
bear on migratory flows than is possible over long land borders. While the development of reception 
centres, passport control and immigration criteria were developed in this era, they initially served a 
very open immigration policy.  
International air traffic has kept migration flows fairly concentrated, but illegal and legal 
migration are still occurring, often across land, which is expensive and geographically difficult to 
control. The USA in particular finds it very difficult to patrol its long Mexican border. Although new 
fences have been effective, many have died in the deserts, victims of harsh conditions, unscrupulous 
smugglers, private raiding parties, among other causes. The problem of land borders is also present 
in Europe, for example, the German and French long land borders: but unlike the situation with the 
US-Mexico border, these now fall, of course, within the European Union and are in effect open 
borders.  
All EU countries tightened up their immigration legislation and enhanced policing powers in 
the 1970s and 1980s. These measures included strict sanctions on airline carriers; tighter visa 
requirements; denying access and the due process of law to many forcibly displaced peoples 
including asylum seekers; and the penalisation of undocumented aliens. Yet, none has been able to 
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reverse the tide of rising migratory flows from illegal cross-border entry, although they have (until 
recently in Europe, that is) contained its growth.  
Given these circumstances, states have turned to a variety of forms of internal surveillance 
and control of the composition of their populations. In most European countries there are legal, 
constitutional and political obstacles to giving the police major powers to stop and check identities 
on suspicion. Where those powers have been allocated they have often resulted in the abuse of civil 
liberties or regular and systematic discrimination against visible minorities. Accordingly, liberal 
democracies have often tried to control illegal migration by controlling access to the labour market. 
This includes an increasing tendency to penalise employers using illegal labour. However, even in the 
USA where this has been a fairly draconian policy, it seems to make only a marginal difference – 
reflecting the limits of state institutions and the resources and technologies available to them, and 
the failure of those agencies to win the cooperation of many socio-economic actors.  
In short, the capacities of liberal democratic states to manage migratory flows have 
increased with the establishment of immigration agencies, the documentation of citizenship and the 
funnelling of migrants through check points, harbours and airports. But the ability of migrants to 
evade the grasp of the state has also risen as overall numbers of travellers have increased, and as 
the increase in tourism and student exchanges has opened more loopholes in immigration agency 
practice. This is one of the many sources of the evermore contentious politics of immigration.  
The intensification of the migration crisis in the European Union: between 9/11 and climate 
change 
The European Union today is at a conjuncture of significant migratory pressures. Some of 
these are familiar and represent recognisable past patterns, for example, the 9/11 wars 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, among others). But others are new. If migration can be seen as the most 
ubiquitous form of globalisation, climate change can be understood as one of the gravest 
consequences of global transformations. The anthropocene has been given enormous impetus by 
economic globalisation which, in turn, has created new drivers of migration. The UNFCCC (in effect 
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from 1994) and the IPCC (formed in 1988) have been concerned about the creation of ‘climate 
refugees’ from the outset. While refugees are typically associated with, and often legally determined 
by, conflict and human rights abuses, in this context the phrase seeks to capture the way climate 
change now increasingly intersects with conventional security concerns. 
Since the end of the Cold War, migration has taken on a new momentum as patterns of 
conflict have shifted and intensified with the start of the 9/11 wars. The combination of  Western 
military interventions, ‘anti-terrorism policies’, and increased civil conflict have led to a dramatic rise 
of migration as a whole, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in particular – would-be refugees 
that simply have not yet crossed an international border. Refugees and IDPs are two sides of the 
same coin, some separated by border fences and some by seas.  The European Union has been 
attempting to follow containment policies – basically seeking to prevent people from migrating. 
Containment policies exacerbate widespread civil insecurity stemming from failed interventions, civil 
conflicts, regional collapse, and the widespread threat to human life chances in many areas, 
particularly the Middle East and North Africa.  
These new patterns have been given an additional impetus by the changing nature of 
environmental degradation. Environmental crises are not, of course, new. For most of human 
history, the main way in which environmental shocks occurred was via unintentional transportation 
of flora, fauna, and microbes (Crosby, 1983). The European colonisation of the New World, which 
shifted diverse forms of natural life across the Atlantic, within a generation all but wiped out a 
substantial majority of the indigenous population of the Caribbean, Mexico and other parts of Latin 
America. Until the mid-20th century most forms of environmental degradation, at least the 
degradation that could be perceived, were local or regional or, occasionally, transregional. However, 
since the end of Second World War, the globalisation of environmental degradation has been 
massively accelerated by a number of factors: 70 years of extraordinary resource-intensive growth in 
developed world; the industrialisation of Russia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet states; the 
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breakneck industrialisation of China and many parts of Asia; and the massive rise in global 
population.  
The result is an unprecedented array of global environmental problems, including climate 
change, the destruction of global rainforests, the loss of biodiversity, and oceanic and riverine 
pollution. Of these, climate change poses the most severe existential threat. Despite 20 years of 
multilateral negotiations under the UN, a global deal on climate change mitigation or adaptation 
remains elusive, with differences between developed countries, which have caused the problem, 
and developing countries, which will drive future emissions, forming the core barrier to progress 
(see figure 3). Multilateral governance is gridlocked over climate and, in this context, it is not 
unreasonable to expect climate change to become an ever more powerful cause of migration (Hale, 
Held and Young, 2013). Climate change is wreaking havoc on the world’s diverse species, 
biosystems, and socio-economic fabric. Violent storms are becoming more frequent, water access is 
becoming a battleground, rising sea levels may well, as predicted, displace millions, the mass 
movement of desperate people will become more common, and death from serious diseases in the 
world’s poorest countries will rise rapidly (largely because bacteria will spread more quickly, causing 
greater contamination of food and water).  The overwhelming body of scientific opinion maintains 
that climate change constitutes a serious threat not only in a long term, but in the here and now.  
The term environmental refugee was coined in 1985, and was reinforced in the first 1990 
IPCC report which stated that ‘the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human 
migration as millions will be displaced’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1990, p. 20; see 
also El-Hinnawi 1985). From 2009 to 2014 approximately 27 million people have been displaced 
annually as a result of natural disasters, such as flooding, mud-slides, droughts and violent storms 
(see figure 4). Without an effective policy on climate change, the projections for increasing disaster-
affected displacement are dire. According to UNEP by 2060 there could be 50 million ‘environmental 
refugees’ in Africa alone (Brown 2008). Apocalyptically, Christian Aid in 2007 indicated that close to 
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1 billion people could be permanently displaced by 2050 with climate change being a key driver in 
forced migration (ibid). 
The European Union and the Mediterranean migrant crisis: a case study 
Migration from North Africa to Europe is certainly not new.  For years the Mediterranean 
has been a thoroughfare for migrants trying to reach the shores of Europe. Whilst migrants have 
started their journeys from many African and Middle Eastern countries, they are typically bound by a 
common goal to find greater economic and social opportunities, escape persecution and flee 
conflict. However, there are notable differences in migration patterns over the last few years.  
First, there has been a generalised increase of would-be-migrants attempting to reach 
Europe. Second, there has been a dramatic rise in the departures that travel via the Central 
Mediterranean route. In fact, the EU Border Agency, Frontex, estimates that between 2013 and 2014 
there was a 277% increase (see figure 5). Third, and bearing in mind UNEP’s projections for 
environmental refugees in Africa, the push from Africa is only likely to intensify in the future.  
Across the Mediterranean migration is increasing, but nowhere more dramatically than from 
Libya. From figures 6 and 7, one can see the apparent correlation between migration flows through 
the Central Mediterranean and the regional instability in North Africa. 2011 was a period of 
optimism and migration from Libya declined; but it has been exponentially rising since. The majority 
of the migrants are not Libyan per se. Rather, the greatest number of migrants to date have 
originated from Syria, Eritrea and Somalia, but there are significant numbers also from Nigeria, 
Gambia and Mali just to name a few. The instability and chaos that grips Libya has created a vacuum 
for armed groups, smugglers, gangsters and human traffickers to operate at will; hence, Libya has 
become the dominant point of departure for many.  
The current Mediterranean migration crisis is in many respects a symptom of Western policy 
failures in two key respects. First, the failed intervention in Libya created the instability that led to 
the Central Mediterranean route becoming so popular as a passage to Europe. Second, the European 
countries scaled back recovery efforts just at a time when they were needed the most. From late 
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2013 to November/December 2014 the Italian government ran a relatively effective operation called 
Mare Nostrum, during which time more than 100,000 migrants were rescued at sea.   
However, the operation was costly at €9 million a month, and Italy cancelled it at the end of 
2014 claiming that it was unsustainable without more EU financial backing. In place of Mare 
Nostrum the EU launched the much-scaled back operation Triton. Under Mare Nostrum the Italian 
Navy carried out search and rescue operations across 27,000 miles of the Mediterranean. Under 
Triton, the mandate only covered border surveillance within 30 miles of the Italian coast. The EU 
budget for Triton was only a third of what was spent on Mare Nostrum. To those who paid attention 
at the time, this was a huge, bright, waving red flag. Human rights groups and migration experts 
warned, with virtual consensus, that this would lead to a much larger migration crisis with many 
more deaths in the Mediterranean.  
In the face of renewed crisis (and many deaths) the EU initiated discussions about how to 
address the Mediterranean migrant dilemma. On the 29th of April 2015 the EU Council released its 
summary of their 28 country talks. The agenda moving forward can be summarised in three points: 
confront and prevent smugglers and human traffickers from operating; triple the financial resources 
for EU border operations including the increase of ships and other necessary capacity; and enhance 
refugee protection. For the latter, this includes implementing a ‘Common European Asylum System 
to ensure the same standards in all Member States, an increase of emergency aid to front-line 
Member States, and the deployment of support teams to help process asylum claims’  (European 
Council 2015).   
This could have gone a long way towards mitigating the escalating tragedy in the 
Mediterranean. However, it would certainly be a mistake to consider the matter closed and problem 
solved, even if the EU were able to bring casualties to zero. Upon close inspection of the EU’s 
immediate response, it is clear that it was still driven primarily by an exclusionary regional interest to 
manage and control migration into Europe. These are policies that, whilst having a humanitarian 
veneer, radically exacerbate the burdens of migrants and displaced persons from and in countries 
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like Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia. Stefan Kessler captured the underlying motive behind the EU’s 
new approach: ‘Keep protection-seekers far, far away from Europe so that their deaths don’t make 
the headlines in European media’ (in Siegfried 2015).  Moreover, a conspicuous absence from this 
response, and on-going consideration, is the increasing concern with climate-induced displacement 
and migratory flows. Instead, migration continues to be conceived through a security-specific lens, 
deliberately missing larger parts of the picture. 
It is clear, however, that EU policy has failed both in its narrow objectives and in wider terms 
as migration flows put pressure on multiple entry points into Europe, from Macedonia to Italy, 
Greece to France. Some of these pressures have now become so great that these entry points are 
almost ungovernable. As hundreds of thousands of people pour into Europe from the South and 
Eastern routes, what was once known as the ‘Mediterranean Crisis’ quickly became a larger  
European refugee crisis which threatens to overwhelm existing EU policy structures.  It remains to be 
seen how the interplay between state migration policy and actual migratory movements play out, 
with some countries, notably Germany and Sweden, currently liberalising their border policies, while 
others, the UK and Hungary for instance, are resisting such moves.  
To be sure, these problems are difficult to resolve. The issue of refugees and displaced 
peoples is one of the great tests of the international humanitarian ideals of the 21st century, and of 
the cosmopolitan aspirations of a Europe shaped by ambition to project its soft power and good 
governance across the world. However, when cosmopolitanism meets state interests under 
economic pressure, the former is often cast aside. Europe, racked by the Euro crisis, has become a 
partial, and all too often sorrowful, champion of humanitarian values. There is a paradox wherein 
many European states are cosmopolitan when it comes to championing ideals, but remain sectarian 
when it comes to their implementation.  
There were huge steps that Europe took in the post-war period to move from a region of 
bitter conflict and strife to a pacific union in which (still) the idea of war among European countries 
is almost inconceivable – a supraregional polity shaped by human rights, common frameworks and 
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the rule of law. But like in so much of European history, there are rights for citizens and exclusions 
for others. This divide, previously noted, is constantly policed and a bridge between these poles has 
been hard to build. 
Concluding thoughts 
In a much quoted passage, Hannah Arendt referred to statelessness as the “newest mass 
phenomenon in contemporary history,” and stateless persons as “the most symptomatic group in 
contemporary politics” (1977). It could also be said that internally displaced persons or refugees 
highlight the difficulties of cosmopolitanism with its aspiration for global law and transnational 
accountability.  
In an era of climate change, war and uneven development, the pressures of migration grow 
and could easily create an ever greater avalanche of movement. States act in a paradoxical way. On 
the one hand they recognise, along with all humanitarian organisations, the nature of the migration 
crisis and the necessity to broaden the definition of those who need urgent assistance, not just 
refugees but all those migrants forced to leave for reasons of violence or poverty.  On the other 
hand, nearly every host country acts on increasingly narrow definitions of those who warrant 
assistance and perhaps resettlement.  
The growing crisis of migration, as Pierre Hassner once wrote, “like the problem of genocide, 
or of the environment, or of nuclear proliferation, can be handled only by going beyond the 
monopoly of states toward a more universal perspective, such as that of human rights, or a more 
global one, such as that of a collective interest of the planet” (1998, p.281). As Hassner recognised, 
the question is whether “an effective synthesis of the global and the local, the universal and the 
particular” remains within the sphere of the possible (ibid.).  
Stepping stones to a universal constitutional order, linking the global and the local, are, I 
have argued elsewhere, already in place, set down by some of the most important achievements of 
international law and institution building in the 20th century (see Held 2010). These developments 
generate a conception of rightful authority tied to human rights and democratic values. In this 
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perspective, political power is legitimate if, and only if, it upholds these standards. Moreover, the 
link between territory, sovereignty, and rightful authority is, in principle, broken since rightful 
authority can be exercised in many spheres and many levels – local, subnational, national and 
supranational. Accordingly, citizenship can be envisaged, as it already is in the EU, as equal 
membership in the diverse, overlapping political communities which uphold common civic political 
values and standards. Citizenship, accordingly, is not built on exclusive membership in a single 
community, but on a set of principles and legal arrangements which link people together in diverse 
communities which significantly affect them.  
Stepping stones, yes. But it remains another big step to extend these principles and 
arrangements to the stateless. Short term extensions in the EU could include: centrally funded 
reception centres; coordinated legal routes through which migrants can travel to seek refuge; robust 
asylum quotas for all member states; tackling human trafficking; and providing direct aid to refugee 
camps in the Middle East which are currently home to millions of displaced people. Other difficulties 
need to be addressed as well. One of these lies in the current conception of policy choices: either 
citizenship or send migrants home. Kant laid down over 200 years ago the duty to offer universal 
hospitality to each and all as a condition of a law bound, open global order (1970). Perhaps today the 
idea of universal hospitality can be rearticulated to connote not just search and rescue and/or 
providing temporary aid but a number of intermediate steps that might, at least in small part, fill the 
gap between statelessness and citizenship. Short term working visas and limited working passes are 
among options to ease the crises of the stateless while offering universal hospitality in an era of 
overlapping communities of fate.  Even if this were granted (and we are a long way from this 
happening), the problem would only be stemmed – not resolved. Only when people live securely in a 
world where sustainable development is promoted in all regions, where severe inequalities between 
countries are tempered and reduced, and where a universal constitutional order guarantees the 
rights of all peoples, could this begin to be envisaged. Cosmopolitan ideals, but still, far from 
realities. 
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Figure 1. Major Global Migrations, 1600 – 1915. 
 
 
Source: Held and McGrew et al., 1999, adapted from Kenwood and Loughneed, 1989 
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Figure 2. Major Global Migrations, 1945 – 1995. 
 
 
Source: Held and McGew et al, 1999 
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Figure 3. GHG emissions by region: Baseline, scenario 2010-2050 
 
Note: GtCO2e = Giga tonnes of CO2 equivalent ROW = Rest of the World  
Source: OECD Environmental Outlook Baseline, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Figure 4. Impact of extreme weather 
 
 
Source: Global Call for Climate Change, 2013 
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Figure 5. Increase in migration flows, 2013-2014 
 
Source: FRAN data in Frontex 2015a 
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Figure 6. Fluctuations in popularity of routes to Europe 
 
Source: Frontex in IOM 2014 
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Figure 7. Recent trends in and nationalities of illegal border crossovers 
 
 
Source: Frontex 2015b 
 
 
 
                                                          
i Note: This survey article is based on a keynote lecture I gave, by the same title, to the conference: Human 
Migration and the Environment, held at Durham University, UK, 28th June – 1st July 2015. I would like to thank 
Andrew Baldwin for his generous reflections and comments.  
